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Abstract
For applications such as airport border control, biomet-
ric technologies that can process many capture subjects
quickly, efficiently, with weak supervision, and with minimal
discomfort are desirable. Facial recognition is particularly
appealing because it is minimally invasive yet offers rel-
atively good recognition performance. Unfortunately, the
combination of weak supervision and minimal invasiveness
makes even highly accurate facial recognition systems sus-
ceptible to spoofing via presentation attacks. Thus, there is
great demand for an effective and low cost system capable
of rejecting such attacks. To this end we introduce PARAPH
– a novel hardware extension that exploits different mea-
surements of light polarization to yield an image space in
which presentation media are readily discernible from Bona
Fide facial characteristics. The PARAPH system is inex-
pensive with an added cost of less than 10 US dollars. The
system makes two polarization measurements in rapid suc-
cession, allowing them to be approximately pixel-aligned,
with a frame rate limited by the camera, not the system.
There are no moving parts above the molecular level, due
to the efficient use of twisted nematic liquid crystals. We
present evaluation images using three presentation attack
media next to an actual face – high quality photos on glossy
and matte paper and a video of the face on an LCD. In each
case, the actual face in the image generated by PARAPH
is structurally discernible from the presentations, which ap-
pear either as noise (print attacks) or saturated images (re-
play attacks).
1. Introduction
Face is an appealing biometric modality because it is
more efficient and less invasive than other modalities such
as fingerprint and iris. Automatic face recognition has been
researched for several decades, and in some respects has
been shown to surpass human face recognition capabilities
[15]. However, there is still one large problem that prevents
the use of fully autonomous face recognition systems for
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Figure 1. CONCEPTUAL SCHEMATIC OF PARAPH. The system
captures images under alternating horizontal and vertical polar-
izations, shuttering via a twisted nematic liquid crystal (TNLC).
These alternating images allow us to estimate a PARAPH image
by taking the normalized per-pixel difference of a specular image
and a diffuse image with reduced specular reflections. For a Bona
Fide facial characteristic, the PARAPH image will have lots of
structure related to facial geometry and the diffuse image can sup-
port the normal biometric system. When a presentation attack with
an LCD or display is imaged, the entire screen will be polarized,
the PARAPH image will lack face structure, and the diffuse image
will be mostly noise.
security-critical access control applications: namely, many
face recognition algorithms can easily be spoofed by pre-
sentation attacks [4].
A presentation attack is formally defined as a “presenta-
tion to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of
interfering with the operation of the biometric system” [10].
Such attacks pose a challenge to all biometric systems, but
particularly for the face modality it is very easy for an at-
tacker to acquire high-quality facial image or video data.
Moreover, resolution demands for such facial presentation
attacks are modest, and high-quality printing or electronic
display can produce an image that, when captured by a face
recognition system, is nearly identical to the original im-
age. In addition, high-quality portable displays, in the form
of phones, tablets and laptops, often make presenting fa-
cial images/videos straightforward. Therefore, the produc-
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tion of face spoofing images, formally referred to as arte-
fact images [10], is well within the technological reach of
billions of people. To date, most techniques used in face
anti-spoofing attempt to analyze the original content of the
image or video to detect artifacts that were introduced by
a printer or a video compression algorithm. Only few algo-
rithms incorporate additional information by using infra-red
(IR) or near-infrared (NIR) imagery for presentation attack
detection [9]. While IR has its merits, IR imaging intro-
duces noticeable costs, and spatial resolution is inherently
poorer due to both longer wavelength and focal plane array
limitations [19]. In this paper, we seek a lower cost means
of augmenting currently deployed visible wavelength cam-
eras to reject presentation attacks.
To this end we introduce PARAPH, a system that de-
lineates Bona Fide facial characteristics from spoof media
via light polarization analysis. A conceptual schematic of
the approach is shown in Fig. 1. Because skin polarizes
reflected light perpendicular to the surface normal and po-
larizes the diffuse component in the plane of the normal,
the normalized difference of horizontal and vertical polar-
ization components, the PARAPH image, is tightly tied to
facial geometry. Thus, a human capture subject will elicit
a large response for legitimate facial structure, whereas
an artefact in presentation media will elicit little to no re-
sponse. While the PARAPH image can be used to detect
and reject presentations, standard facial recognition algo-
rithms can be applied to the diffusely polarized component.
Using the diffuse component may actually improve recog-
nition performance by removing many specularities.
The analysis of polarization itself is not new to computer
vision or biometrics. In computer vision applications, polar-
ization analysis under passive illuminations was pioneered
by Wolff and Boult [23], who demonstrated how to use
camera-based polarization analysis to constrain surface nor-
mals, estimate material properties, and discriminate edge
types (e.g., occluding vs. albedo). Polarization measure-
ments are used in several biometric sensors [17, 18, 21], al-
though those almost exclusively rely on crossed or circular
polarizers to manage illumination and specular reflections
under active illumination. For facial recognition applica-
tions, polarization analysis has recently been applied to en-
hance recognition between long and medium wave infrared
(LWIR and MWIR) probe images and the visible spectrum
by fusing histogram of oriented gradient (HOG) features
over several Stokes images [19].
In this paper we show, both theoretically and empiri-
cally, that simple polarization analysis can be used to dis-
criminate Bona Fide face presentation from attack presen-
tations, i.e., facial photos/video displayed on media includ-
ing prints, LCD, LED, and AMOLED displays. Our design
leverages a linear polarizer and a fast-switching twisted ne-
matic liquid crystal to serve as an analyzer at two polariza-
tion angles, in opposition to more traditional/complex linear
polarization analysis [22, 23]. Unlike stereo or thermal/IR
based approaches, incorporating this design into a camera
introduces a materials cost of less than 10 US dollars, even
with our simple prototype; a cost which could be dramati-
cally reduced in mass-production.
2. Theoretical Foundation of Polarization
Light behaves as a transverse wave, with electric and
magnetic field components oscillating orthogonally about
the direction of propagation, the Poynting vector. The ori-
entation of the electric field is known as the polarization
of light. A more detailed overview of polarization can be
found elsewhere [16], but we shall introduce the subject
matter in sufficient detail to motivate PARAPH.
When light encounters a surface, an electromagnetic in-
teraction occurs, which depends on the polarization, wave-
length, and phase of the electromagnetic waves. Often, an
exchange of energy causes a change in wavelength of the
light (color), but a phase shift can also occur – for example,
when light is reflected, the phase changes by 180°. De-
pending on a material’s properties, e.g., the direction of
freest flow of electrons, light of certain polarizations can
pass through the material easily, while light of other polar-
izations is reflected or absorbed. The transmitted light is
partially polarized with one dominant polarization. Mate-
rials that allow one polarization to be almost purely trans-
mitted while blocking the orthogonal polarization are gen-
erally referred to as polarizers. In this paper, we shall pre-
dominantly constrain the discussion to linear polarizations,
where the orientation of the electromagnetic field remains
fixed over time.
The intensity of light transmitted through a linear po-
larizer depends on the relative angle between polarizer and
light polarization, according to Malus’ law:
I = I0 cos
2(θ), (1)
where I0 is the intensity of purely polarized incident light,
I is the intensity of the transmitted light, and θ is the rela-
tive angle between incident light polarization and polarizer
orientation. Unpolarized light refers to light with no prefer-
ence for polarization – or approximately equal polarizations
from all angles. Such light is commonly emitted from a ra-
diating source like a lamp or the sun. The expected intensity
of unpolarized light that gets through a linear polarizer will
therefore be half the incident intensity because:
I = I0
1
pi
∫ pi
0
cos2(θ) dθ =
1
2
I0. (2)
Partially polarized light consists of a superposition of
purely polarized light and unpolarized light. As a polarizer
is rotated, the transmitted light will vary with cos2(θ) from
a minimum intensity Imin to a maximum intensity Imax,
where Imin = 12I0 corresponds to the unpolarized portion
of the light, when no polarized light gets through (θ is a
multiple of pi2 ), and Imax−Imin is the intensity of the purely
polarized light. This phenomenon is commonly referred to
as the transmitted radiance sinusoid.
When light interacts with a surface, it becomes partially
polarized, depending on the surface composition. Reflected
light tends to be polarized parallel to the plane of incidence
– the plane containing the Poynting vector and surface nor-
mal – (s-polarization), while transmitted light tends to be
polarized parallel to the incident plane (p-polarization). The
s-polarized light reflected directly off the surface is a glossy
specular reflection, while light that passes into the surface
and internally reflects several times before passing back out
is known as diffuse reflection. Although diffuse reflection
illuminates the surface, it is generally dull and unpolar-
ized due to many interactions with planar facets in the sub-
surface. However, an exception occurs from diffuse reflec-
tions under extreme angles of incidence, e.g., on occluding
contours, when almost all light propagating to the observer
is multiply-internally reflected along the occluding edge be-
fore being p-polarized from the output transmission. This
results in a subtle aura-like effect around the edges of an ob-
ject, which has a polarization orthogonal to the specularly
reflected component. Note that this partial polarization of
the diffuse “reflection” is actually a result of transmission.
While an in-depth quantitative treatment of the polariza-
tion effects of different materials is well beyond the scope
of this paper, the important point is that polarization char-
acteristics are highly material and texture dependent. This
property of polarized light leads us to hypothesize that we
can discriminate between presentation attack media and le-
gitimate faces by examining differences in their polarization
signatures, an approach that we refer to as PARAPH.
To estimate the transmitted radiance sinusoid and ana-
lyze the polarization of a surface requires at least three,
and often uses four different polarization measurements
per pixel. Early work on polarimetric vision mechanically
rotated a polarizer between subsequent frames, but rotat-
ing fast enough to achieve video rate polarization imaging
is complex and hence not cheap; bossanovatech.com sells
cameras using computer-controlled rotating polarizers. Al-
ternatively, one can use beam-splitting and multiple cam-
eras, such as in the system commercially available from
fluxdata.com, but this too is expensive. An even higher-
end approach, available from 4dtechnology.com, is a single
high-speed camera with a grid of pixel sized polarizers, pre-
cisely aligned to replace the traditional Bayer pattern. Such
cameras can support hundreds of frames per second and can
work in NIR, but the cost per unit starts at 10,000 and in-
creases to over 25,000 US dollars. A much lower cost “do
it yourself” approach for obtaining full polarization imag-
Figure 2. POLARIZATION OF A FACE. Images were obtained by
manually rotating a polarizer in front of the camera of a Samsung
Galaxy S6 Edge™ smartphone. Left: linear horizontal polariza-
tion. Center: linear vertical polarization. Right: PARAPH image
IP from Eq. (3). Under horizontal polarization, the intensity of
specularly polarized light is noticeably greater. Note that scaling
has been applied for visualization.
ing using two different types of polarization cameras and
a Raspberry Pi2 can be found online.1 While all of these
approaches allow full linear polarization (Stokes) state esti-
mation, which takes at least three measurements, for presen-
tation attack rejection – at least of basic attacks – we believe
we can significantly reduce complexity and cost using only
partial state estimation. Thus we explore an approach using
only two polarization measurements.
3. Discerning Presentation Attacks
While we could simply examine faces through arbitrary
polarizations and observe the optical effects, our goal is to
develop a simplified, but still principled approach, which
clearly differentiates legitimate faces from spoof media.
From the discussion in Sec. 2 and our knowledge about fa-
cial geometry, we make the following observations:
1. From the vertically elongated geometry of human
faces, we would expect p-polarization from diffuse
“reflection” to be maximized (on average) at a polar-
ization angle of 0° (vertical) on the sides of the face
and at an angle of 90° (horizontal) on top and chin.
2. We expect that specularly reflected light from the
cheeks, nose, and forehead should be polarized at 90°
since, by definition, the visible portion of the face is
facing the viewing plane.
3. Because the orientation for Imax will be directly re-
lated to surface normals of the face, the polarization
image will tightly match face geometry.
From these observations, let Ih be an image taken under
a 90° polarization, and Iv be an image taken under a 0° po-
larization. Let us further assume that the images are pixel-
aligned. Then the normalized image of maximum contrast
1http://www.diyphysics.com/category/
instrumentation/polarimetric-imaging
in intensity due to polarization, the PARAPH image IP , will
approximately be:
Imax − Imin
Imax + Imin
u IP =
Ih − Iv
Ih + Iv
, (3)
which is the average maximum change in amplitude of the
transmitted radiance sinusoid for either vertically or hor-
izontally polarized light. An example of IP is shown in
Fig. 2 along with respective Iv and Ih images. Face images
will have noticeable differences under Iv and Ih. The intu-
ition discussed in Sec. 2 and previous research [23] suggest
that faces and presentation materials will have much differ-
ent IP images. IP is trivial to obtain, though the constraint
that Iv and Ih be pixel-wise aligned can make low-cost sys-
tems a bit more complex. To create a low-cost system ca-
pable of acquiring a PARAPH image with a single camera
and no moving parts at scales above the molecular level, we
utilize twisted nematic liquid crystals (TNLCs) with their
remarkable ability to twist light polarizations.
TNLC molecules naturally align along their elongated
edges. When contained in an enclosure with a grating of
parallel nanometer-thick ridges on both ends – each end ori-
ented orthogonally to the other – the end-molecules “get
stuck” in the ridges, and the bound molecules assume a
helical chain, which has the electromagnetic effect of a
phase-retarder, twisting the polarization of the emitted light
by 90°. However, when an electric potential of sufficient
strength is applied across the two ends of the polarizer,
the resulting electric force breaks the molecular bond, and
causes the molecules to realign, axially oriented perpendic-
ular to both ridge gratings. The polarization of the light that
passes through no longer changes. Placing a TNLC in front
of a vertical polarizer leads to the following effect: when no
potential is applied to the TNLC, incident horizontally po-
larized light will adopt a vertical polarization after passing
through the liquid crystal and will pass unhindered through
the vertical polarizer. Incident vertically polarized light on
the TNLC will be emitted from the liquid crystal with a
horizontal polarization and will not pass through the verti-
cal polarizer. When an electric potential is applied, the op-
posite happens: Vertical light incident on the liquid crystal
will maintain its original orientation after passing through
the TNLC, and will pass freely through the polarizer, while
horizontal light incident on the TNLC will remain horizon-
tally polarized and, thus, not pass through the polarizer. By
placing a lead on each side of the TNLC and toggling cur-
rent, a camera sensitive only to light intensity, placed in
front of the polarizer (which is placed in front of the liquid
crystal), can easily measure the intensity of two orthogonal
components of polarization, Iv and Ih.
Provided that the refresh rate of both the camera and liq-
uid crystal is greater than the rate of noticeable motion, an
approximate pixel-wise alignment can be achieved. Modern
webcams achieve frame rates of 30 FPS or greater – even
the inexpensive ones – but what about liquid crystals? Con-
veniently, TNLCs are precisely the technology used to tog-
gle active-shutter glasses for 3D televisions, typically oper-
ating at 120 Hz, which is more than enough to obtain subse-
quent frames of orthogonal light polarizations (incident on
the TNLC) for a 30 FPS camera.
For our design, we obtained both liquid crystal and polar-
izer by disassembling a pair of G7 Universal active-shutter
120 Hz kids 3D glasses with Duo Sync Technology™, which
we bought for 9 US dollars on eBay. We used a 5V battery
DC power supply soldering wires to a lead on each side of
the TNLC, with simple switching to toggle power on/off.
The net added cost needed to measure polarization (exclud-
ing stabilizing clamps, tripod, and an inexpensive webcam)
was less than 10 US dollars. Even with this inexpensive
prototype, the differences between legitimate faces and a
variety of presentation attacks can be easily distinguished,
which we will show in the next section.
4. Evaluation and Discussion
Unfortunately, we cannot readily compare our algorithm
to other state-of-the-art face anti-spoofing systems that are
evaluated on default benchmark datasets [24, 2], since we
need polarization information from the live data. Conse-
quently, the images and video streams in these datasets are
insufficient for our purposes. Instead, we conducted our
own small-scale tests using high quality printed images on
matte paper, high quality printed images on glossy paper,
and videos taken from LCD monitors.
To demonstrate that our system works even under non-
trivial lighting with low resolution, we used 352x288 im-
ages taken from a 10 US dollar VAlinks® USB 2.0 webcam.
Prior to computing the PARAPH image, we convolved the
Ih and Iv images with a 5x5 Gaussian filter to denoise the
images and reduce sensitivity to misalignments. Compar-
isons of PARAPH images IP along with the raw Ih and Iv
images are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. Although PARAPH
images are computed in color, they are shown in grayscale
to enhance visibility. A uniform scaling/shifting to a visible
pixel space is also applied, since IP in Eq. (3) can only as-
sume values between −1 and +1. Fig. 3 shows the subject
of the same identity as shown in the printed images, while
Fig. 4 shows a subject of different identity. As expected,
each of the presentation media yields a PARAPH image that
is noticeably different than that of an actual face.
For each medium, the differences between the presen-
tation image and the actual face are rather extreme. The
intensity from the LCD screen is very low. We cannot even
discern an image, because LCD screens themselves emit
linearly polarized light; crossed polarizers – one in front of
and one behind the LCD – ordinarily yield a black screen.
Thin film transistors cause the liquid crystals in the pixels
of interest to align and let light through. The refresh rate
(a) Live face vs. face displayed on an LCD
(b) Live face vs. face printed on glossy paper
(c) Live face vs. face printed on matte paper
Figure 3. FACES: REAL AND PRESENTATION MEDIA SUBJECT 1. Vertical polarization images (left), horizontal polarization images
(center), and PARAPH images (right) are shown for each of the faces. As a function of the vertical polarization of the LCD in (a), we can
clearly differentiate this attack even with one polarizer. Note that the intensity of specular reflection on the face is greater for images taken
at horizontal polarizations than for vertical polarizations, but as an inherent property of the screen the intensity of the LCD is far greater
for vertical polarizations, and thus yields a very low intensity PARAPH image. While the high quality glossy print in (b) may be good
enough to spoof facial recognition systems that use conventional cameras, its PARAPH image looks little like a face due to a relatively
uniform polarization of the gloss. A high quality printed photo on matte paper has a PARAPH image that traces the silhouette of a face
as shown in (c), but is devoid of fine structure. With the cheap webcam that we used, the dark regions of the image have noticeable noise
which results in artificially large values for Eq. 3 which leads to the apparent face silhouette. Future work better noise reduction. Note:
scaling has been applied for visualization.
(60 Hz in this case) refers to the rate of toggle for each row
of pixels. From Fig. 3(a) and Eq. (3), we can see that the
light emitted from the LCD is vertically oriented. If the
LCD screen were non-vertically polarized, it would be vis-
ible, but no facial-like structure would be prevalent because
light is emitted; not reflected in a single polarization.
(a) Live face vs. face displayed on an LCD
(b) Live face vs. face printed on glossy paper
(c) Live face vs. face printed on matte paper
Figure 4. FACES: REAL AND PRESENTATION MEDIA SUBJECT 2. Vertical polarization images (left), Horizontal polarization images
(center), and PARAPH images (right) for a second subject. Note: scaling has been applied for visualization.
Glossy photo paper is often perceived as higher quality
by humans than conventional printer paper. Interestingly,
though both presentation media are clearly differentiable
from an actual face, the glossy paper is more clearly dif-
ferentiable. The matte print resolution is the same, but a
noisy silhouette of the face is far more noticeable. This ef-
fect could be caused by polarization differences from ink
around planar facets of the matte paper, which do not occur
in a smooth gloss coating. However, none of the PARAPH
images show the fine-grained structure in presentation me-
dia that is clearly visible for the actual faces.
To attain non-trivial illumination conditions, subjects
were placed in the corner of a room with a wall on the left
side as seen by the viewer, which attenuates specular reflec-
tion from that side of the face. In the PARAPH image, we
can clearly see much more granularity and far less structure
on the wall side of the face, resulting from less specular and
more diffuse polarization. The wall side of the face is also
darker than the unpolarized background, while the oppo-
site side of the face is brighter. The brightness is caused by
specular reflection from the horizontal polarizer on the right
side of the face, i.e., sign(IP ) > 0 because Ih > Iv . Since
the diffuse component (vertical polarization) is subtracted
in Eq. 3, and specular reflection on the left side of the face
is more or less absent due to the non-specular wall, the left
side of the face in IP is negative and therefore much darker
than the right side and slightly darker than the background.
While a diffuse component exists on the right side of the
face as well, this component is dwarfed by the relatively
bright specular reflection in Ih. Thus, IP for this region
assumes positive values. As explained in Sec. 2, the polar-
izations of diffuse and specular components differ because
the diffuse “reflection” is is caused by transmission of inter-
nally reflected light along occluding contours. This explains
the intensity differences between sides of the face in our
PARAPH images. Under uniform lighting conditions, the
face appears symmetric, consisting of either dark “diffuse”
reflection or bright specular reflection, but in either case,
structural information for the face is apparent. Our analysis
has shown that even under uneven and non-trivial illumi-
nation conditions with an inexpensive noisy low-resolution
camera, the PARAPH image of the Bona Fide face is readily
distinguishable from the presentation spoofs.
5. Other Approaches to Face Anti-Spoofing
Although other approaches to anti-spoofing differ dra-
matically from our PARAPH approach, in that none of them
leverage passive light polarization analysis, we believe that
this other research bears mentioning. A broader survey on
face spoofing and antispoofing techniques in particular is
presented by Galbally et al. [9].
Most researchers attempt to perform face antispoofing
based on the original image or video data to counter printed
and video-based replay attacks. These approaches have
the advantage that they do not require any special hard-
ware and they integrate nicely into existing image- or video-
based face recognition systems [3]. To counter printed at-
tacks, where a photograph of the victim is printed on paper
and held in front of the camera, texture based algorithms
have been used to detect artifacts that were introduced by
the printer. Motion-based approaches try to find a differ-
ence in motion between the foreground (face) and the scene
context [1], or they require the cooperation of the subject
by prompting for a specific head movement, e.g., nodding,
smiling, or blinking [9, 13]. However, these systems have
the disadvantage that they require a video-based recognition
system. They cannot effectively be used in static systems
that provide only a single image for verification [9].
Texture and motion based algorithms have achieved rel-
atively high spoofing detection rates [5], but most of them
are limited to anticipated attack types. They are not robust
to novel types of spoofing attacks, such as 3D mask attacks
[8], for which yet a different set of algorithms has been
developed [7, 14], nor are they resistant to spoofing with
makeup.2 Additionally, research suggests that texture- and
motion-based antispoofing algorithms are highly dependent
on the dataset, on which they were trained, and are not yet
ready to be applied in production [6].
To date, only a few other works have attempted to de-
tect spoof attempts by leveraging specialized hardware to
acquire information other than raw 2D image intensity data.
An obvious attempt to detect print and replay attacks, which
are usually displayed on a flat surface, is to use 3D imag-
ing techniques. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no such counter-measure has yet been proposed; the clos-
est approach that we could find uses a light field cam-
era [11]. Other systems, which require active illumina-
tion of the scene with LEDs to delineate attacks from real
accesses based on reflectance information, have been pre-
sented [12, 25], but these works have only demonstrated
their capabilities of detecting 3D masks made of silicon
or paper. Another approach uses thermal imaging [20]
for liveness detection, capturing both IR and visible spec-
trum images at the same time. However this approach re-
quires good cross-spectral spatial alignment, which the au-
thors performed using hand-annotated eye and mouth coor-
dinates. The system’s capabilities under autonomous cross-
spectral alignment were not tested. Further, no study to our
knowledge has been performed on how thermal presenta-
tion attack detection systems are affected by environmental
conditions (e.g., cold weather, direct sunshine).
The PARAPH technique that we present in this paper is
different than all the other existing techniques in that – in
principle – it can detect any kind of currently known spoof-
ing attack. How to effectively detect print or replay attacks
using polarization has been demonstrated in Sec. 4. Mask
or prosthetic attacks can theoretically be detected by clas-
sifying the difference in polarization profiles between the
mask/prosthetic and human skin [23], but the technique pre-
sented in this paper would likely need to be refined and ex-
tensive experiments conducted – we did not have access to
3D printed masks at the time of this writing. Two of the
biggest advantages of our approach over other specialized
hardware techniques are first, that it is completely passive,
neither requiring active illumination of the scene nor ex-
tra/specialized infrared cameras, and second, that it is quite
cheap by comparison. PARAPH also does not prompt the
capture subject for explicit facial cues. Hence, we believe
PARAPH could easily and inexpensively be incorporated
into existing facial recognition systems for authentication
and access control, e.g., border control, building access, and
electronic payment, and that with additional R&D could be
2Spoofing a face recognition system by makeup won the
ICB 2013 TABULA RASA Spoofing Challenge, see http:
//www.tabularasa-euproject.org/evaluations/
tabula-rasa-spoofing-challenge-2013
extended to passive surveillance applications as well.
6. Conclusion
PARAPH is a novel passive low-cost approach, which, in
principle, defeats many known and possibly several unan-
ticipated presentation attack types. Unlike purely algorith-
mic solutions, many of which rely on unreliable or ac-
tive behavioral cues, PARAPH is based on robust laws of
physics. The system is difficult to spoof because polariza-
tion depends on both shape and material type of the me-
dia in question. Our approach is not the only presenta-
tion attack detection approach to exploit the laws of physics
through hardware, but it is far less expensive than others.
We have not yet tested the system using masks, prosthet-
ics, and makeup. However – theoretically speaking – our
approach should be able to detect these attacks since the at-
tack media have different polarization characteristics than
human skin, but to work well it may require higher quality
imaging and a full Stokes state vector. We leave this evalu-
ation to future work.
There are several ways in which PARAPH could be ex-
tended. First, higher quality materials could be used. Sec-
ond, active lighting of known angle and polarization could
be applied to enhance the quality of PARAPH images.
Third, polarization measurements could be added to obtain
a full Stokes state vector. Finally, polarization informa-
tion could be fused with other antispoofing techniques, e.g.,
we could exploit cross-spectrum (visible, SWIR, MWIR,
LWIR) polarization information or perform stereoscopic
polarization measurements incorporating depth informa-
tion. While all of these techniques could enhance quality
and difficulty to spoof, they come at the cost of additional
complexity and expense. Weighing these tradeoffs is an im-
portant subject, which we leave to future research, along
with extended experimentation and the collection of a po-
larimetric dataset of capture subjects and presentation at-
tacks.
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